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Insurgent Nationalism: Political Imagination 
and Rupture in Côte d’Ivoire 
Till Förster 
Abstract: Non-separatist insurgents unable to overthrow a sitting govern-
ment often face a problem successful rebellions can avoid: They are not the 
only players who can claim to be acting on behalf of the nation. They will 
have to imagine the nation in a new way that distinguishes them from the 
older, established nationalism usually promoted by the existing government. 
This new nationalism aims to legitimise their actions, but first and foremost 
it has to be attractive to the population in the region under insurgent control 
and later to others as well. Each camp, the government and the insurgent 
side, articulates its understanding of the nation to the other side. In the pro-
cess, both sides often also adopt different forms of imagination to render 
the specifics of their nationalism more visible to their followers as well as to 
partisans in the other camp. This article analyses this political articulation by 
taking Côte d’Ivoire as an example.   
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Despite widespread talk of failing states in Africa, the deficiency of their ad-
ministrations and the precarious statehood that they engender, most countries 
on the continent still profit from strong feelings of nationalism. Most rebel 
movements in Africa do not aspire to secession (Englebert 2009); they aim to 
oust incumbent presidents rather than to completely change the political re-
gime (see the recent history of, for example, the Central African Republic or 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo). When they succeed, they can and 
often do adopt the nationalistic rhetoric of their predecessors. When they fail 
and become rebel movements controlling only part of the country, they find 
themselves in an uncomfortable situation (Clapham 1998), since they cannot 
simply repeat the message of their adversaries and are forced to develop an 
alternative view of the nation. How such insurgent nationalisms emerge and 
how rebels dissociate their views from those of other actors, in particular the 
sitting government, is the subject of this article.1  
Insurgents have to address two sides when they formulate their vision 
of the nation: One is the sitting government and its (il)legitimate claims to 
the nation. The other is the populace under rebel domination, which often 
shares other images of what the nation is or what it ought to be. All actors, 
politicians and militaries loyal to the legal government, as well as insurgents, 
make use of such images of the nation in the process of political articulation, 
deliberately trying to impose their views as the dominant ones. The nation as 
an imagined community is a nodal point in this discursive formation – that 
is, the centre of the overlapping and simultaneously conflicting claims to 
nationhood that generate both alliances and antagonisms between partners 
with diverging interests (Laclau and Mouffe 2001 [1985]: 107-111). 
Nationalism is an appealing political concept, even, perhaps particu-
larly, where the nation-state is but a memory of a distant past. Liberia, Sierra 
Leone and the two Congos all serve as examples: Even after decades of war 
and an almost complete absence of state governance, the actors still believed 
in the nation as a central object of politics and in the nation-state as a pow-
erful institution that could resolve their problems. The same holds true for 
Côte d’Ivoire, where the conflict that had divided the country for almost 
nine years was immediately forgotten when the national football team played 
in the African Cup of Nations2 or the World Cup.3 The image of one nation 
represented by one football team was so powerful that for a short time it 
1  Similar processes often unfold in such situations. See, for instance, the relationship 
of the Tamil Tigers with the central government (Mampilly 2011).  
2  E.g., on the occasion of the semi-final in Libreville on 8 February 2012, when Côte 
d’Ivoire beat neighbouring Mali 1-0.  
3  E.g., when Côte d’Ivoire drew 0-0 with Portugal on 15 June 2010. Portugal was the 
overwhelming favourite to win.  
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brought the political debates to an end. Imagined as one community, Côte 
d’Ivoire’s football team in its orange shirts, with the national logo on the 
chest, was a sign of the nation’s continuance that so many longed for. Men-
tal images translate into visible pictures, and visible pictures feed into the 
political imaginary of a society. Political interests and claims are articulated 
through these images, and the actors often identify with such interests and 
claims more through visible pictures than through verbal statements.  
Surprisingly, this interaction between visible and verbal references to 
the nation has not attracted thorough scholarly attention. Art historians, 
who are experts on pictures and their use, seldom publish on the political 
imageries of postcolonial nations.4 Political scientists also rarely engage in 
such analyses.5 Benedict Anderson’s excellent and seminal book on nations 
as “imagined communities” (Anderson 1983 [2006]) is almost entirely silent 
on the significance of pictures and images, despite its title. Its focus is words 
and discourse. And anthropologists sometimes seem to forget that the po-
litical imagination also produces images, not only narratives (see, for exam-
ple, Comaroff and Comaroff 1999). In political theory, the works of Charles 
Taylor (2004) and, in particular, Cornelius Castoriadis (1975 [1998]) have 
influenced reflections on imagination. However, their impact on empirical 
studies, in particular in anthropology, has been limited. This contribution 
thus seeks to outline what such an interdisciplinary approach to political 
imagination – an approach that recognises the significance of the visible and 
the legible – might look like. It does so by taking Côte d’Ivoire under rebel 
domination as an example.  
Image and Imagination
Much of the literature on political imagination makes use of the notion of 
imagination in a rather unspecific, intuitive way. Most publications focus 
more on the content of imagination – for instance, political ideas and agen-
das – than on imagination itself. As a distinct dimension of social practice 
and as a concept in social theory, imagination is almost totally absent in an-
4  There is, however, a considerable body of literature on the use of pictures and 
images in Western history. See, among others, Fulcher 1987, Clark 1997, Howarth 
1997, Groys 2008, Hinderliter et al. 2009.  
5  See Kertzer 1989, Mampilly 2011 as notable exceptions and Simone 1994 as one of 
the few studies on Africa. Hayward and Dumbuya (1983) and more generally 
Edelman (1985) adopted a similar perspective and looked more at “symbols”, 
which would not fit here, as symbols imply that there is a fixed meaning while the 
case studied here shows that such fixed meanings do not exist.  
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thropological debate.6 At times, it is subsumed under the Weberian concept 
of legitimacy, which certainly has an imaginative dimension, as the domi-
nated populace usually has some normative understanding of what domina-
tion should look like. However, Heinrich Popitz’s first element of “basic 
legitimacy” – that is, the power to harm as a source of superior force7 – 
shows that legitimacy does not necessarily imply a normatively imagined 
political order. Vice versa, the imagination of the nation as a community, as 
a social order of how its members will want to live together, does not neces-
sarily affect the basic legitimacy of state domination.  
There is often a remarkable distance between the state as an organisa-
tion and imaginaries of the nation: The images that imagination as a social 
practice engenders may differ significantly from what people have to live day 
in and day out. It would be short-sighted to label these images of how social 
cohesion should be produced, lived and renewed within the nation as an 
ideal form of state. The nation is an imagined community, though not nec-
essarily a state.  
A comprehensive grasp of imagination as a practice that produces col-
lective images may not be necessary to work on understanding political 
transformation per se, but it is useful to sharpen one’s comprehension of 
imagination in order to articulate more clearly what this process is about and 
how it affects the political. I will therefore discuss imagination8 more gener-
ally before using it as a concept to analyse nationalism and its transfor-
mation during the rebellion in Côte d’Ivoire.  
In classical philosophy, imagination is usually thought of as the coun-
terpart of memory. In his “Treatise of Human Nature”, David Hume 
(1739–1740 [2003:  6-7]) wrote that imagination is the faculty that allows us 
to bring “a perfect idea” to mind. Hume’s pairing of memory and imagina-
tion is characterised by greater vivacity on the part of memory and more 
freedom from “original impressions” on the part of imagination. He privi-
leges memory because it links actors to the “original” experience and gener-
ates ideas that build on “reality”. For Hume, imagination is able to transpose 
and change the ideas we have in mind. This distinction mirrors common 
parlance, which usually assumes that imagination is about imaginary things 
and events that exist only in human minds. This is, however, a misunder-
6  In contrast, the literature on social or collective memory is abundant. Notable 
exceptions are Emirbayer and Mische 1998, who discuss imagination as an essential 
part of agency, and the special issue of the Irish Journal of Anthropology (McLean and 
Coleman 2007).  
7  Popitz 1992. See also von Trotha (1994a, b) whose concept of basic legitimacy 
builds extensively on Popitz.  
8  I elaborate the concept of imagination more fully in Förster (2013).  
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standing. Imagination is needed to anticipate the future or, from a phenom-
enological perspective, that which could become real – in short, what we as 
humans could experience in another circumstance. That circumstance could 
lie in the future, in the past or in a different social or physical space. For 
Hume, imagination has political significance in that the ideas it engenders 
may inform the goals that actors seek to achieve.  
As a faculty of mind, imagination is an essential part of human agency 
(Emirbayer and Mische 1998). If we were not able to imagine alternatives to 
our present lives, we would have no reason to act or to engage in any project 
to change our lives. We would simply react to stimuli from without. What 
we have in mind when we imagine is something Hume calls an “idea”: an 
entity in our thinking, a mental object. An image as mental object is charac-
terised by some degree of continuity and coherence. These characteristics of 
images are the product of figurative thinking.9 Therefore, imagination has 
two facets: the practice of imagining and the image that it produces. I use im-
agination to cover both imagining and image. In rough terms, imagination 
can then be understood as the production of images. In more philosophical 
terms, one could distinguish an act-phase from an object-phase of imagina-
tion (Casey 1976 [2000:  40-60]).  
Imagination can be a purely individual activity, but the more we con-
sider possible examples, the more we become aware of the deeply social 
character of imagining as practice and the image as object. We share ideas 
and mental images of what, for instance, a social order should look like. 
Such shared images often inform powerful political movements and moti-
vate their members to become activists. Images are also communicated: 
Charismatic leaders disseminate their images of an alternative social order 
among their followers, who would then adopt them and make them their 
own. Images may grow out of unstructured interactions: Images of Europe 
as a “greener pasture” are so widespread in Africa that no campaign has 
been able to prevent Africans from leaving their homes on what Western 
politicians call an unsafe journey towards a precarious labour market.  
Before analysing the two aspects of imagination more closely from an 
anthropological perspective, a word on images as mental objects will help to 
clarify what imagination is about. One may think of imagined, mental ob-
jects as images tout court, but there is more to it. The continuity and coher-
9  One may read this sentence as a statement on how meaning is created – that is, 
more through figuration than through narration. The most prominent advocate of 
this anthropological presumption is Wittgenstein, whose understanding of image 
rests on five pillars (Wittgenstein 1922: 4.01-4.022). The first three, which are rele-
vant here, can be summarised as follows: An image aims to be a model of reality by 
projecting its own logical structure onto that reality.  
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ence that Hume mentions is perhaps better framed as a specific trait of fig-
urative thought. For him, imagined objects have a vague form because they 
are but distant representations of former “impressions”. When we imagine, 
be it as individuals or as a group, we, at least in some degree, create the rec-
ognisable form that later helps us to remember or to plan for the future, a 
fact that Hume ignores. John Locke is more helpful here. He claims that 
ideas as mental images are an important instrument of understanding be-
cause they bestow form upon sensory impressions (Locke 1689 [2008], book 
IV, ch. I.9: V). Images are hence independent mental objects, and not 
merely mirrors of sensory impressions. Understanding images in this sense 
reveals how they may work in a setting that is, say, characterised by frag-
mentation and anomy: A coherent image overcomes the bounds of mere 
representation by endowing the object, be it existent or not, with recognisa-
ble features. The longing for a better social world may then find expression 
in a mental image that gives scattered experience a form. The image would 
provide a key to understanding a complex situation that an individual would 
otherwise perceive as confusing. In everyday language, it would simply help 
in understanding a situation, but from a phenomenological perspective, an 
image actually creates that situation because its form would not be percepti-
ble without it. As such, images are intentional. By providing significant form 
to a contingent situation, they serve to orient the actors’ agency. Images are 
intentional objects in the sense that they orient actors toward specific con-
tent – for instance, an alternative social, moral or religious order that would 
overcome a situation of anomy and fragmentation. Images are useful be-
cause they have the power to demonstrate, to organise experience, to figure 
out what a situation is about. Put briefly, producing images means to show.10  
This short discussion confirms that there are good reasons11 to adopt 
the heuristic distinction introduced by W. J. T. Mitchell in his seminal work 
on “picture theory” (Mitchell 1995): Pictures are material objects, images are 
mental objects. In the sense that Mitchell suggests, one could understand 
image as a mental (re)presentation of something that would or could also be 
visible as a material object – that is, as a picture. But what does “intentional 
object” then mean? Would this understanding not lead back to Hume and 
his conception of imagination as a weaker mirror or perception? Intention-
ality, however, creates independent objects that are more indebted to actors’ 
need for orientation through form, through which the actors acquire means 
10  For a general, though individualistic, perspective, see Boehm 2007.  
11  There are more reasons than those discussed here. The counterargument claims 
that the distinction between picture and image is heuristic only because the two 
merge in everyday experience. For a thorough discussion, see Belting 2011; Boehm 
2007; Boehm et al. 2010; Mitchell 2005.  
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of articulation. But intentionality is not necessarily tied to an individual. If 
images can be social and cultural objects, they can also be collective intentional 
objects. This raises a set of complex questions: Will images become collec-
tive objects when they are communicated? Will images retain their mental 
character or will they have to become pictures when they are communi-
cated? Or are there social practices that directly generate collective images? 
And how would the actors articulate their views through them?  
The easy answer is that collective images are but the sum of individual 
images that the actors have in mind. Such summative accounts presume that 
all or most actors will adopt such collective images if they belong to one 
culture – that is, if they as members of that culture know other members will 
have the same images in mind.12 In the end, this is a conception of images as 
givens that simply belong to an existing culture as common knowledge or, 
perhaps more fashionably, as meaningful text.13 This does not answer the 
questions raised above. One needs to look more closely at both facets of 
imagination: First, one has to analyse imagining as a social practice that ei-
ther evokes collective intentionality toward images or creates images as collec-
tive intentional objects. The first practice would bring existing images to-
gether, perhaps adapt one or the other, and hence generate an imagery of 
more or less closely related images. This leads to a sharing of images, while 
the second practice generates joint images. Consequently, one needs to learn 
more about how actors as individuals or as groups relate to images when they 
engage in such social practices.  
This question points to the problem of the emergence of shared inten-
tionality. Images motivate actors to engage in collective action such as joint 
protests against an oppressor or against rules and regulations that, according 
to the interpretation suggested by the image, damage the wellbeing of all. In 
such cases, imagination would transform individual experience into collec-
tive experience by causing an image to proliferate among those who partici-
pate in the activity. How that is done is an open question that only empirical 
research can answer. But the reverse happens, too: Social practice may cre-
ate shared intentionality and the intentional objects that actors then perceive 
as images. If imagination grows out of such sociality, we could rightly call it 
a distinct dimension of social practice. Imagination is then best understood 
as a social practice that creates images as collective intentional objects. Such 
12  Margaret Gilbert (1989) rightly criticises such accounts in her brilliant book on social 
facts.  
13  The Geertzian understanding of culture as meaningful text (Geertz 1973) does not 
clarify why and how individuals accept and reproduce that common knowledge – it 
just takes this for granted. I recast the social philosophical account by Quinton 
(1975) and its critique by Gilbert (1987, 1996) in more anthropological terms.  
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images are as real as the intentional objects of individuals. How that social 
practice differs from the individual practice is again a question that calls for 
careful, empirically based analysis. Anthropologists may help to find an 
answer because of their thick participation in the social practices of others.  
The Ivoirian Crisis: A Sketch  
Until the end of the 1990s, Côte d’Ivoire seemed to be one of the most 
stable states of sub-Saharan Africa. Under the regime of the first president 
and founding father of the postcolonial nation, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, 
the country experienced a period of relative prosperity. By the end of the 
1970s, le miracle ivoirien – more or less steady economic growth, a stable social 
and political order and close ties to the former colonial power France – had 
become proverbial in West Africa and a widely accepted image of the coun-
try, willingly promoted by Ivoirian media. While its neighbours went 
through a seemingly endless series of crises, the population of the Côte 
d’Ivoire enjoyed the privilege of belonging to one of the very few economi-
cally promising African countries, attracting millions of migrants from the 
entire sub-region and in particular from its Sahelian neighbours to the north, 
who accounted for roughly one quarter of the populace by the end of the 
1990s (Le Pape and Vidal 2002).  
In the 1980s, the sharp decrease in raw commodity prices, in particular 
coffee and cocoa, brought the Ivoirian miracle to an end, though not yet the 
imaginary of an exceptionally successful African state. Together with the 
“winds of change” that blew over Africa after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 
economic downturn pushed President Houphouët-Boigny, then already 
about 90 years old, to admit opposition parties and to allow other candidates 
to run for president in the elections of 1990.14 After his death in 1993, his 
successor Henri Konan Bédié tried to occupy the same dominant position in 
Ivoirian politics. To compensate for his personal weakness, he increasingly 
resorted to political repression. He adopted a policy of outright political 
discrimination and prevented his main rival, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, 
who came from the north of the country and was known as ADO in Côte 
d’Ivoire, from participating in the presidential elections.15  
Bédié underpinned his politics of exclusion by adopting and actively 
promoting the notorious idea of ivoirité, literally “Ivoirity” or “Ivoirianness”.16 
14  On Félix Houphouët-Boigny’s life, see Grah Mel 2003, Diégou 2000, Koné 2003. 
15  Poamé (2007) and McGovern (2011: 15-30) provide overviews of the Ivoirian crisis.  
16  On ivoirité, see the collection of primary texts in Ethics, 1, 1996, and, from a scholarly 
point of view, Dozon 2000 and Marshall-Fratani 2006. 
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As a cultural idea, the term was first used by Ivoirian intellectuals in the 1970s. 
It remained virtually unknown to ordinary citizens until the mid-1990s, when 
Bédié encouraged the elaboration of the idea into a political concept that 
could help to redefine nationhood and citizenship in the face of the multieth-
nic heritage of the country and the growing number of immigrants. Ivoirité 
drew a highly normative image of the nation, defined as a uniform, undivided 
community with only one culture and one history. The consistency of the idea 
of ivoirité excluded all parts of the population that did not meet the conditions 
of what was imagined as the core of the nation: local origin, Christianity and a 
sort of Ivoirian Western modernity.17 The notion of a cultural “Ivoirianness” 
was penetrated by more and more nationalist ideas, which increasingly built on 
populist xenophobia. Ivoirité was cast in a set of legal texts and administrative 
regulations. The most prominent was a restrictive new code électoral, which 
stipulated that a candidate for the presidential elections had to be born of 
Ivoirian parents who were themselves Ivoirians by birth.18 It targeted one 
person, the leader of the opposition party, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, who 
was suspected of originating in Burkina Faso.  
Although Bédié’s politics of exclusion provoked protests among the 
members and supporters of the two big opposition parties, they did not 
deeply affect daily life until they turned into a practice that informed most 
administrative procedures. Citizens of “dubious nationality” faced outright 
discrimination. Controls at roadblocks were tougher and bribes were higher 
for those who bore a family name considered to be of foreign origin. This 
particularly affected those with the Manding names, which are widespread in 
Côte d’Ivoire, as they are in Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso. “Muslim” cos-
tume was another indicator that could lead to harassment, because “true 
Ivoirians” had to be Christians. Still worse was the carrying of a foreign 
identity card. In particular, citizens of Burkina Faso were targeted: In the 
fertile centre and west of the country, where many of them had settled as 
cocoa and coffee planters, they were repeatedly evicted and their holdings 
illegally expropriated. At the time, says a 41-year-old refugee, 
17  It is sometimes argued that ivoirité more or less reproduces a disjuncture inherited 
from precolonial and colonial times, because ethnic groups in the southern half of 
the country would not overlap, as the peoples in the north do, with groups in 
neighbouring Ghana and Liberia. However, all the bigger groups in the south do 
so: Akan is spoken and understood on both sides of the Ghanaian–Ivoirian border, 
and Kru also live in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire.  
18  Ouattara could not provide sufficient evidence as he lacked the birth certificates of 
his parents. His candidature was rejected in 1995 and in 2000 and in turn, his party 
boycotted the elections.  
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you tried to speak with a pure Ivoirian accent, even if it was bad 
French and you knew how to speak properly. Some learned nouchi19 
for that purpose only. You tried to avoid all encounters with civil 
servants, and if you couldn’t, you made sure that you had enough 
money in your pocket – just to bribe him so that he would not insist 
on seeing your identity card. Travelling was terrible. You were sitting 
on the bus, and then the policeman came in and said that everybody 
should raise his identity card up in the air. The policeman went slowly 
down the aisle and if he discovered that you couldn’t produce one 
and he suspected that you were not an Ivoirian citizen, he took you 
out of the bus and made you wait beneath the trees […]. You could 
spend half a day or longer there before you were allowed to move. Of 
course, the bus had left by then. You had to find another and you had 
to buy a new ticket – in addition to what he had made you pay. My 
god, how much time I have spent there! In the end, you always 
thought twice before you decided to travel. And it was worse for 
young girls! They sometimes had to offer their bodies before the po-
licemen would let them go.20  
By the end of the 1990s, ivoirité had become a callous image, an ethno-na-
tionalist ideology that led to the marginalisation of the entire population in 
the northern half of the country. Later, in 2002, resistance to it became one 
of the driving forces of the rebellion that constantly tried to produce coun-
ter-images of and for the nation as an inclusive society where everybody 
could find a place (Förster 2012b), while ivoirité redefined the postcolonial 
politics of belonging in terms of ethnicity, autochthony and religion (Arnaut 
2008b). This image stood in stark contrast to the official politics of Hou-
phouët-Boigny, who had always labelled Côte d’Ivoire le pays de l’accueil, “the 
country of welcome”. However, by the end of the 1990s, day-to-day nation-
alism had become exclusive, if not a political instrument of oppression. Its 
discursive formation did not play a role as long as it remained an affair of 
the elites, but when ivoirité turned into an administrative practice, it ques-
tioned the foundations of the postcolonial nation.   
At the same time, profound problems of governance became visible. 
Many regions, in particular the rural areas and the disadvantaged quarters of 
major cities, were no longer under the control of the increasingly corrupt 
19  Nouchi is a type of slang spoken in popular neighbourhoods in almost all the bigger 
cities of Côte d’Ivoire. It is mainly based on a simplified French grammar and vo-
cabulary, but includes words from various local languages. 
20  A refugee who left the west of Côte d’Ivoire with one of the last buses in Septem-
ber 2002. He did not want his identity to be published (pers. comm. 14 January 
2007, my translation). 
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police and gendarmerie. In the late 1990s, large areas of the interior turned 
into unruly fiefdoms that had to rely more or less on self-organisation. On 
Christmas Eve 1999, rising political tensions and economic decay led to the 
first coup in the history of Côte d’Ivoire. General Robert Guéï, soon nick-
named “Father Christmas”, claimed to (re)establish “true democracy” through 
“free and fair elections” but then took refuge in the same ethno-nationalist 
ideology. One of the main opposition parties21 boycotted the elections of 
October 2000. In the confusing turmoil of post-election violence, Laurent 
Gbagbo of the Front Populaire Ivoirien, FPI, was declared the winner of the 
elections by the Supreme Court. Though he had fought against ivoirité ideology 
before, he soon made use of the same strategies of exclusion as his two prede-
cessors. He continued to marginalise the population of the north and increas-
ingly also of the west of the country, the local stronghold of General Guéï.  
On 19 September 2002, insurgent soldiers, supported by allies from 
Burkina Faso and possibly Liberia, tried to capture the main cities of the 
country, including Abidjan. While they failed to overthrow the Gbagbo 
administration in the south, they were able to take control of the centre, the 
north and the west of the country. Only after the partial failure of the coup, 
they founded two, later three political movements.22 In 2004, the three 
movements created an umbrella organisation named the Forces Nouvelles, 
FN, with an armed wing, the Forces Armées des Forces Nouvelles, FAFN. 
As a united front, they articulated their political ideas immediately against 
the ideology of the Gbagbo regime and claimed a country and a nation that 
would accommodate everyone living on its soil.  
After an initial period of extreme uncertainty, the rebels, who saw 
themselves as “children of the soil”, increasingly became aware of the urgent 
need to improve the situation for the ordinary population and to establish 
some sort of governance. They gradually established services and offices 
that guaranteed a more or less normal life. Some of these were direct con-
tinuations of the former administrative structures, but others were new and 
grew out of the continuous exchange with the population and also with 
international NGOs and the UN peacekeeping forces that had been dis-
patched to the major cities in the rebel zone in 2003 and 2004.23 Statehood 
as a practice survived the end of state administration. In some fields, rebel 
governance was even more bureaucratic than the state’s governance had 
21  The Rassemblement des Republicains, RDR, an offshoot of the former single political 
party, the Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire, PDCI. See above footnote 18.  
22  The Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire, MPCI, in the north, the Mouvement 
pour la Justice et la Paix, MJP, and the Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand 
Ouest, MPIGO, both in the west of Côte d’Ivoire. 
23  Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d’Ivoire, ONUCI. 
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ever been. In others, habitual practices were continued without any institu-
tional support (Förster 2012a).  
After the signing of the Ouagadougou peace treaty on 4 March 2007, it 
was planned to bring state administration back to the rebel-held parts of the 
country. However, the process proved much slower than foreseen and did 
not lead to the mere re-establishment of state authority. Until the fall of the 
Gbagbo regime in the south in April 2011 – and in some aspects even after 
that date – a new kind of parallelism between state and non-state institu-
tions, practising different modes of governance, emerged. This phenomenon 
directly relates to the interaction between rebels and civilians in this part of 
the country and the modes of governance that had emerged since 2002. 
Performing the Second Independence
In that context of violence and political competition, nationalism was per-
formed at many levels and by both sides.24 The settings in the north and in 
the south differed from each other, but were successful in their own ways. 
Indeed, the performances of nationalism in the two parts of the country 
were intrinsically related, as each side deliberately wanted to articulate its 
difference. In the north, the rebels were largely unprepared and had not 
foreseen the need to establish some sort of sustainable domination. This was 
a practical and a political challenge. First, they could not fall back on the 
existing state apparatus. Most of the civil servants had left immediately after 
the coup, and those who fled the south because they were of northern origin 
24  The following ethnographic descriptions are based on fieldwork conducted in 
various parts of Côte d’Ivoire between 2006 and 2012. As it is not always easy to 
conduct ethnographic research in conflict zones (see Nordstrom and Robben 
1996), data sources for the two halves of Côte d’Ivoire are different. While the data 
from the north build on direct observations and to a considerable extent on 
participation in ceremonial events and daily urban life under rebel domination, the 
data from battlegrounds and the south stem mainly from interviews with returnees 
and with other witnesses (for instance, bystanders, comrades in arms, friends and 
relatives). These accounts were recorded over a period of approximately three 
months and later compared to footage that was or still is available on the Internet 
(hence the frequent references to websites). One of the major difficulties was that 
certain actors on both sides aimed to exploit the ethnographer as an intermediary 
who would spread their own perspectives to the wider world. They often became 
suspicious when they learned that I would also talk to people from “the other side”. 
I sometimes had to choose between two unsatisfactory options: a) talking to 
someone from the other side and making former partners so suspicious that they 
would no longer talk to me, or b) not talking to the others and obliterating that 
other perspective. Research in such a conflict setting is often a compromise 
between ideal standards of empirical research and what is feasible on the ground.  
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were unfamiliar with the local settings. Second, there was hardly any political 
agenda apart from the will to overthrow President Gbagbo. Third, and most 
prominently, they could borrow from neither the older, Houphouëtist na-
tional propaganda nor the more recent nationalist ideology of ivoirité. The 
former was too closely associated with the former unity party, the PDCI-
RDA of deposed President Bédié, while the latter was out of question. Even 
the Rassemblement des Republicains (RDR) of Ouattara, which would have 
been a natural ally, did not want to get too close to the rebels, because 
Ouattara rightly assumed this would discredit his future candidature at the 
international level. The nation and nationalism had its history, but the dou-
ble dislocation25 by ivoirité and the failed insurgency left it open to all sorts of 
enunciations, experiments and new forms of articulation. This double dislo-
cation opened a social space that fostered the emergence of new forms of 
political imagination.  
On the southern side, the reaction to the dislocation was bold and di-
rect. Gbagbo and his FPI party strengthened their attempts to build a 
“truly” Ivoirian nation: an image of a fully independent Côte d’Ivoire ad-
vanced by the “good” intentions of “true” Ivoirians who would fight “as 
one” for the “second independence” of “our Côte d’Ivoire”.26 At first sight, 
the events that followed 19 September were a simple intensification of the 
xenophobic imaginary that already existed and that was subsequently staged 
in the violent acts against migrants from Burkina Faso, Mali and finally 
against French citizens living in Côte d’Ivoire.27 Such an interpretation, how-
ever, falls short of the performative character of Ivoirian (ultra)nationalism. 
It reduces agency to the execution of cognitive plans that actors already have 
in mind. I argue against such an understanding by separately outlining the 
political rhetoric as narrative and the dramatic performances that (re)pro-
duced the image of a finally independent nation. 
At a discursive level, Gbagbo developed a fairly stable narrative that 
denounced the rebellion as foreign intervention. His interpretation probably 
rightly asserted that Burkina Faso and its president, Blaise Compaoré, were 
accomplices of the insurgents. However, by embedding this point in the 
wider context of neocolonial struggles, he insinuated that the leaders behind 
25  I use the term dislocation in the sense of post-Marxist theory – that is, as invalidation 
of existing patterns of articulation; see Laclau 1996; Laclau and Mouffe 2001 [1985]. 
26  On the new vocabulary as a political instrument, see Gadou 2009.  
27  McGovern (2011: 127-36) questions such interpretations of the most violent period 
in Ivoirian history, but then falls into the same trap when he posits that “actors like 
Blé Goudé appear to be carried away by their own rhetoric” (2011: 128).  
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the insurgency28 came from the neighbouring country and that the rebellion 
was ultimately instigated by France, because, according to him, a colonial 
power would never tolerate a “really independent” African leader such as 
himself. Therefore, he claimed, it had failed to respect the amity treaty, 
which stipulated that both parties would defend each other in case of out-
side aggression. The Ivoirian nation, he said, would not tolerate such a neo-
colonial intervention. He would lead Côte d’Ivoire to its second, its “true” 
independence. His narrative embedded these elements in a particular figura-
tion, which provided the model for interpreting recent events as an outcome 
of (neo)colonial history.  
As a narrative, Gbagbo’s interpretation had had its effects on intellectu-
als (Atchoua N’Guessan 2008; Arnaut 2008b). However, a much more in-
fluential forum for the new nationalism developed elsewhere, and it had a 
completely different, performative character. It involved the Young Patri-
ots,29 an institution that became notorious for its assaults on other citizens 
as well as foreigners and for its violations of human rights.30 They served as 
a conduit for the performance of nationalism on the southern side of the 
front that had divided the country since 2002. The Young Patriots brought 
several youth organisations together, all in favour of Gbagbo and his party.31 
As a political movement, however, it was much more than a mere annex of 
the FPI. Charles Blé Goudé, a former speaker of the Ivoirian student asso-
ciation, founded it on 26 September 2002 as a reaction to the insurgency 
one week earlier.32 Soon nicknamed général des patriotes, he transformed the 
movement into a militia of the president’s party.  
28  There were many early hints that Burkina Faso’s army provided weapons to the 
insurgents. See, among many other sources, Doudou 2002.  
29  The full name clearly reveals the nationalist agenda of the Young Patriots: Alliance 
des Jeunes Patriotes pour le Sursaut National – “Alliance of Young Patriots for 
National Survival”. On the movement in general, see Banégas 2007, Arnaut 2008a, 
McGovern 2011.  
30  See various reports of Human Rights Watch accessible at <www.hrw.org/fr/afr 
ica/cote-divoire>.  
31  Among them the Coordination des Jeunes Patriotes, COJEP, the association’s main 
precursor, also founded by Blé Goudé; la Sorbonne, a discussion circle of FPI stu-
dents; and a big chunk of the Fédération des étudiants et scolaires de Côte d'Ivoire, 
FESCI. The latter, which was the official students’ organisation of the country in the 
1990s, had also been the home organisation of Guillaume Kigbafori Soro, who later 
became the civil spokesperson of the rebellion and finally prime minister under 
Gbagbo and Ouattara (cf., Konaté 2003). The Young Patriots were later joined by the 
Collectif des mouvements de femmes patriotes (2003), the Sentinelles pour la paix 
(young girls and women between 15 and 23, also in 2003) and other organisations.  
32  Ironically, Blé Goudé had to fly in from Manchester where he was enrolled in an 
M.A. programme on Conflict Prevention and Mitigation.  
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The Young Patriots adopted many of the arguments put forward by the 
president and disseminated them in public discussion and debate. The fight 
against neocolonialism and for liberty and an independent African nation 
was central to the organisation’s political agenda. It then invited its members 
to perform the nationalism it promoted. The Young Patriots had to become 
un mouvement de combat, “a combat movement”, said Blé Goudé.33 Under his 
leadership, the Young Patriots, now Gbagbo’s bataillon de la rue, organised 
mass meetings and protests in Abidjan and other parts of the country under 
Gbagbo’s control, using all means of communication, including the Internet. 
The movement had its own slogans, T-shirts, logo, brochures, and it pro-
duced and distributed its own music on CD, including death threats against 
various French citizens, Nicolas Sarkozy, Barack Obama and Alassane 
Ouattara: Meurtre rituel pour Alassane Ouattara.34 After the peace talks in Linas-
Marcoussis near Paris in January 2003, the Young Patriots destroyed the 
French Cultural Centre. The most brutal episodes in the Young Patriots’ 
short history were probably the extremely violent aggression against French 
citizens, other foreigners and international institutions in Abidjan in No-
vember 2004 and later, in 2006, their attacks on ONUCI offices in Abidjan 
and Guiglo in the west.35  
The meetings and demonstrations of the Young Patriots had a highly 
seductive character. Many resembled sport and dance events, with continu-
ous chanting and rhythmic parading.36 The young men and women were 
often accompanied by drums and later vuvuzelas; some held Ivoirian flags in 
their hands while others wore the same orange tricots as the national foot-
ball team or T-shirts with emblems of the Young Patriots, and still others 
wore no shirts at all.37 Some smeared red oil or paint on the upper parts of 
their uncovered bodies, which suggested that they were covered in blood. 
Yet others tied red ribbons around their heads, painted their faces, some in 
the colours of the Ivoirian tricolore, some in white or orange. Sometimes, they 
brought huge loudspeakers to the places where they assembled, playing 
33  The term was still quoted on the occasion of his arrest in January 2013, see 
<http://yawowusu.blogspot.ch/2013/01/ble-goude-arrested.html> (2 July 2013).  
34  Jeune Afrique, Les bataillons de la rue, 22 November 2004, online: <www.jeuneafri 
que.com/Article/LIN21114lesbaeurale0/> (12 December 2004). 
35  See the report by the Worldwide Human Rights Movement of 30 November 2004, 
online: <www.fidh.org/IMG/article_PDF/article_a2079.pdf> (12. December 2004), 
and various reports at <www.interet-general.info/spip.php?article3178> (20. Decem-
ber 2004).  
36  See, for instance, <www.youtube.com/watch?v=5gpRPIUPIk4> (15. March 2011). 
Cf., Arnaut 2008a.  
37  The naked breast or upper part of the body is a sign of ritual purity in many parts 
of Côte d’Ivoire.  
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Zouglou, the music of the young urban protesters of the 1990s.38 Indeed, 
the Young Patriots adopted and adapted many elements from urban youth 
culture. An eyewitness account shows how the participants were sucked into 
the performance:  
I was in Yamoussoukro where I tried to get across the frontline into the 
north. It was too risky to stay because I have a Muslim name, and you 
know what that meant at the time. So I thought it best to participate in 
the Young Patriots’ demonstration that took place along the main road 
– just to pretend that I was one of them. It was really something I had 
never seen before! There were thousands and thousands of young peo-
ple, all shouting that the French should go. You couldn’t see where the 
demonstration started and where it ended. It seemed that the entire city 
was out in the street; they were just coming out of all compounds and 
joined those who were already marching. Everybody shouted “Down 
with the French” and “Don’t let them escape”, and things like that. 
Buses were standing in the middle of the crowd, they couldn’t move, 
and there were men climbing on the top, waving their arms, shouting at 
the others around them, always the same slogans. “Go and get Ouat-
tara! Bring ’im here; he’ll see!” and “Gbagbo or nothing!” And then you 
suddenly hear yourself shouting, too. You don’t notice, but then you do 
it. You’re running together with them down the road, and you’re 
screaming, just screaming. And the longer you do it, the more you feel 
how that creeps up in you, how you just want to do as the others do. In 
the end, you believe that all that is right.39  
This looks like an extreme case of seduction perhaps, but one that is reveal-
ing and that conforms well to Canetti’s brilliant analysis of “crowds and 
power” (Canetti 1960 [1962]). Joining in the rhythmic performance was 
essential to many demonstrations by the Young Patriots,40 including those 
38  On Zouglou as a social phenomenon, see Konaté 2002. The musical style, together 
with hip hop rhythms, still served as background to songs that demanded the liber-
ation of Gbagbo after the fall of this regime; see <www.youtube.com/watch?v 
=EucqcDzHvdk&feature=related> (15 July 2012). 
39  As I was conducting my fieldwork in the north, I heard few accounts of such 
demonstrations by the Young Patriots. I quote a man somewhere between about 22 
and 24 years old who, for obvious reasons, was reluctant to talk to me and insisted 
that I never let anyone in the north know that he had participated in such events 
(pers. comm. 11 January 2007, my translation). For a similar event in 2011, see 
<www.youtube.com/watch?v=SvI8KYxjq8E> (1 April 2011).  
40  A video from the campaign for the presidential election in 2010 first shows Laurent 
Gbagbo dancing the Zouglou and then Charles Blé Goudé dancing on a pickup 
truck and animating a crowd of followers, online: <www.youtube.com/watch?v 
=xzsUxYjHmt0&feature=related> (11 December 2011).  
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that later turned violent. On one hand, Charles Blé Goudé, who orches-
trated many of these demonstrations, was certainly a demagogue, if not a 
dangerous agitator, who should be held accountable for these acts. Political 
claims were articulated through them, and it is no exaggeration to say that 
they were organised whenever the Gbagbo regime needed to mobilise the 
youth on its behalf, in particular when it came under increasing pressure 
after the lost election of 2010 and during the civil war of 2011. On the other 
hand, it is clear that these mass demonstrations also worked when Blé 
Goudé was not present. The key expressions – Anticolonialisme, Deuxième 
indépendance, Sarkozy et Obama assassins and, of course, C’est Gbagbo ou rien – 
were known by almost everyone who, willingly or not, had participated in 
such events. As dramatic performances, they very successfully reproduced 
the image of the only true and undivided nation that would not allow any 
intrusion from outside, filled with communitas in Victor Turner’s sense – a 
community of “complete equality” (Turner 1967: 100). This was a practice 
of imagination based on collective acts distanced from the cognitive narra-
tives that filled other social spaces. Accordingly, words rarely constituted a 
narrative on such occasions. Though Blé Goudé gave speeches, he usually 
deployed rather simple clichés, riddles and sayings that the audience already 
knew. There were references to Gbagbo’s narrative, but rarely did they form 
a text. What gave his performances more impact was his visible excitement 
and the fervour of his body language.  
What was it then that “crept up” in the young man? First, the demon-
strations created strong emotional bonds among participants – even among 
those critical of the Young Patriots and their political agenda, as the quota-
tion shows. In other words, it created a joint identity and feelings of em-
powerment, as the following widespread slogan illustrates: Les jeunes se lèvent 
en hommes, “the youths rise up as men” (Banégas 2007). Second, they raised 
awareness of Gbagbo’s imagined nation, what his regime thought of as Af-
rica’s “second independence” – an independence that would overcome 
dependency on foreign aid and France as a colonial power. It linked the 
experience of the past, of suffering and intervention, to the imagination of a 
better future, the image of a country and a people that were the masters of 
their own destiny. The young men and women experienced precisely this, 
their collective power, when they participated in the demonstrations. Most 
of them were not aware that they were misused – and the imagination of 
that second independence is still so strong that many continue to claim it.41  
41  See the comments on the speech by Blé Goudé after the fall of the Gbagbo regime, 
online: www.youtube.com/watch?v=fB9NINzDHHU&feature=fvwrel and <www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=mcoPgXh1Yos> (12 July 2012). 
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“We Are Serious”: The New Nation 
The insurgents in the north did not immediately articulate their claims to the 
nation and a new kind of nationalism. There were more urgent tasks at 
hand. When the coup failed, the rebels had to secure control over their part 
of the territory. First, they needed to recruit more soldiers, which proved 
easier than expected because the rebellion enjoyed considerable support 
among the population by then. Second, there were internal conflicts to be 
settled, either by force or by compromise. Third, the rebellion, which had 
started as a military insurgency, had to build up some sort of civil organisa-
tion capable of representing the movement and of negotiating at the na-
tional and international level. Last but not least, the insurgents had to estab-
lish some sort of governance, as the state administration had collapsed.  
What a new nation would look like was a topic that only surfaced with 
the gradual establishment of rebel governance. Until then, the general pop-
ulace had other priorities. The first months of fighting had brought the econ-
omy to a standstill, and many inhabitants were more or less silently trying to 
survive. Traders could not access Abidjan and its harbour; markets were 
closed and the few factories had to close, too. Though the Muslim merchants 
of Korhogo and Bouaké, the two largest cities under rebel control, were well 
experienced in regional trade, it took them almost a year to establish regular 
trade with the ports of Lomé in Togo and Accra in Ghana. They also had to 
make the rebels understand that they needed some sort of predictable regula-
tion of overland transport.42 Then, however, the absence of police, gendarme-
rie and customs became an advantage. Many goods imported from China 
were far less expensive than in the south. A sort of shopping tourism slowly 
developed, and by 2006 or 2007 even custom officers from the south were 
coming north to buy tax-free Chinese motorcycles.  
In Korhogo and the Senufo region, the most urgent matters had been 
settled by 2005 when Fofié Kouakou Martin was appointed comzone, com-
mander of Zone 10, which included roughly the former counties of Korhogo 
and Ferkessedougou. He enjoyed a reputation as a brutal man, but unlike his 
predecessors, he had an agenda that went beyond mere self-enrichment – 
though he did not miss a chance to line his own pockets. While he seldom 
addressed the populace directly, he had pickup trucks with loudspeakers that 
drove through the city telling the people what he had planned, and there were 
meetings every Thursday morning in his camp where civilians could plead for 
a particular service or have a say in urban affairs. To some extent, these meet-
ings replaced the urban council, which was more or less dormant during this 
42  Fees for overland transport were sorted out by their spokesperson and the rebel 
leader, Förster 2009.  
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time. Fofié repeatedly claimed that he wanted apporter de rigueur à la ville, “to 
bring rigour to the city”. His aim was, he said, “to make Korhogo a nice 
place to live”.43 That already distinguished him from other comzones in the 
rebel-held part of the country. But he did not engage in long, explanatory 
public speeches. He wanted, his supporters said, to “work through his acts 
and achievements” for the city and the county under his control.44 Arguing 
the rebels’ cause was, they said, the task of Guillaume Soro, the leader of the 
political wing of the rebel movement and the direct counterpart of Laurent 
Gbagbo.  
Fofié’s plans “to develop” the city built on the usual international de-
velopment discourse, but unlike former mayors, all of whom came from the 
same family, he insisted that only “delivery” would count: The city should 
visibly improve, not on paper only. Fofié’s means were rarely compatible 
with those of the rule of law, but the fact that he distanced himself from the 
former, thoroughly corrupt mayors and their administrations was welcomed 
by many, in particular the urban youth. Once his position as comzone was 
secured, he invited the elites and the Muslim traders of the city to come up 
with ideas about what could be done. He put the screws to them, but that 
was seen as necessary by the youth, who had experienced urban politics as a 
patrimonial game to which they had no access. Fofié’s politics had a double-
sided character. On one hand, he deliberately staged his actions against the 
backdrop of the existing patrimonial networks, in particular the clan of the 
former mayors, to gain the support of those who had had no chance under 
the old regime. On the other hand, he insisted that rigueur meant something 
was actually accomplished. Both sides were interwoven with a thread of 
arbitrariness and, when he deemed it necessary, of violence, too. Fofié urged 
the rich merchants to clean the streets in front of their shops and houses 
and to contribute to the maintenance of public squares and buildings, either 
in kind or in cash. Many traders remember this time as difficult, but at least, 
they said, “one could see what was done with the money – while you didn’t 
see anything under the old mayor”.45 The rebels levied fees from the owners 
of market shacks and obliged others to buy the plots on which they had 
constructed more solid stands. Fofié urged the electric power company to 
43  Interview, Global Security, 29 March 2006, some eight months after he was ap-
pointed, online: <www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/03/mil-060 
329-irin05.htm> (15 May 2007).  
44  This attitude was also mirrored in a mural on the walls of the Cultural Centre, 
which he had built. It showed Fofié with a chisel and a hammer in his hands, re-
building the city under the supervision of ancestors (Förster 2013).  
45  Pers. comm. of a wholesale trader in rice, maize and Chinese motorcycles, 
Korhogo, 14 January 2010.  
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build a power line to a disadvantaged neighbourhood, and so on and so 
forth. All this gained him much legitimacy. Probably even more important 
were the regulation of roadblock fees and the provision of security in and 
outside the city (Förster 2009). He made clear that criminals would be killed 
if they were caught red-handed. Once brought to Fofié’s camp, they were 
not seen again.46  
However, Fofié successfully claimed that he, through his acts and not 
through discourse, would change the social order and give everybody a fair 
chance, as this quotation from a middle-aged man from Korhogo shows:  
You must know that all this was not practised this way before. We were 
always told that “discouragement isn’t Ivoirian”47 – but it was. Oh yes, 
it was. You had no chance to get a job, unless you were a child of a “big 
man”. In the administration, you had to pay a one-year salary or even 
more in advance to the public officer who would recruit you. And if 
you couldn’t, he would … [just forget you]. If you were poor, you had 
to stay poor […]. You went to see your parents back in the village to 
help you, but they didn’t believe you. In the end, they would tell you: 
“I’ve nothing.” And you know it’s true. Oh my god, I’ve eaten ground-
nuts for days, simply because it was cheaper […]. I was better than my 
classmates, but I had to leave school. I couldn’t afford it anymore. And 
if you had a girlfriend, a good-looking girl, then the teacher would bully 
you until you would tell the go48 that you couldn’t carry on the relation-
ship. It ends there, and sometime later you will find that the teacher has 
had her. It was outrageous! Outrageous! I don’t mean that it doesn’t 
happen anymore – but it has become risky for those who don’t behave 
correctly. So you better take care. The commander49 was right when he 
said that we needed some rigour. We needed it badly, and nobody 
should lie about this. Don’t tell me that wrongdoing is normal! If you 
do something fishy now, you have to stand up for yourself.50 Be a man! 
That’s Ivoirian!51  
Fofié wanted to get beyond the image of brutal militia leader, not least because 
he had to face the allegations of UN peacekeeping forces. When he granted 
46  Since 6 February 2006, Fofié has been sought for such violations of human rights by 
the United Nations, see <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8631.doc.htm> 
(30 July 2008).  
47  Découragement n’est pas ivoirien was a widespread expression under the old regime. The 
French term also covers demoralisation, faintheartedness and despondency.  
48  La go is a nouchi word for a young and good-looking woman.  
49  In common parlance, Fofié is usually called by his military title.  
50  In the sense of being held accountable.  
51  The speaker was about 40 years old, jobless and made the statement in a rather 
heated discussion, 17 January 2008.  
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interviews to European journalists, he stated his commitment to “develop-
ment” – a signifier that is, though quite empty, easily accepted by international 
donors. Unlike his peers, he adopted a cultural and educational policy. In 
2006 and 2009, his visions of the city under rebel domination were painted 
on the walls of the new cultural centre (Förster 2013). Later, on the occasion 
of the 50th anniversary of Côte d’Ivoire’s independence from France in 
2010, he, together with various groups and sponsors, organised a parade and 
feast that aimed at including all parts of Korhogo’s civil society (Förster 
2012b). The rebels also supported the big meetings of the hunters’ associa-
tions, which were as carefully arranged as the independence festivities. Al-
most all the events the rebels organised followed a schedule that was fixed in 
advance. In Korhogo, the schedule had to be approved either by the council 
that the rebel leader had put into place or directly by him if he or his troops 
were involved. “Fofié could become quite unpleasant”, a neighbourhood 
headman52 told me, “when something did not work out as planned. He 
hated the trickeries that politicians are so famous for. Politics are dirty, and 
he wanted to get things done.” The majority of my interlocutors agreed that 
Fofié’s politics were about what he called another, a new and better Ivoirian 
nation – one that had overcome the politics of exclusion at all levels and 
also the clientelism and corruption that was related to it. The new Ivoirian 
nation that he staged was a nation for all citizens, regardless of their origin, 
their language, religion, wealth or age. Without doubt, it was a beautified 
image of what the nation should be, but one that proved highly attractive to 
many in the north, the part of the country that felt excluded from the nation 
under Gbagbo.  
Suffice it to add that this image of a new Ivoirian nation was as imagi-
nary as that on the other, the southern, side. What is more important, how-
ever, is that it grew out of a different practice, out of another kind of imagi-
nation. The image of the nation Fofié advocated was not based on sponta-
neous gatherings and participant excitement – it was much more a series of 
acts and events highlighting different aspects of the image of civil virtues 
that would characterise the new Ivoirians. Not only was the content, the 
understanding of what an Ivoirian nation could be, different from the 
southern version of nationalism – so was the way of imagining itself. In the 
final section, I argue that this difference of imagining is directly related to 
how the two parts articulated their political claims.  
52  The headman was about 60 years old and had been in office since 2006.  
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Spontaneously Controlled 
In each half of the country, the formation of nationalism was built on dif-
ferent components. The rhetoric of nationalism was one, but an equally, if 
not more, important part was social practice – the performance of national-
ism. While the first could be perceived and read as text, the second created 
images – images of what the Ivoirian nation should look like. The first was a 
narration, a chronologically constructed argument an audience could listen 
to and that actors as individuals or as groups would eventually quote. The 
second was a series of performances that worked because they established a 
relationship to the elements that made up the nation and enabled the audi-
ence to experience these elements as one. By participating in that social 
practice, they created a figuration, an image of the nation. Though still re-
lated to rhetoric and text, the image’s normativity grew out of the social 
practice that the actors willingly or unwillingly engaged in. Indeed, the im-
ageries of the nation proved to be much more attractive than the official 
agendas of the major politicians. The text, notably the ideological narrative 
of ivoirité, addressed the intellectual elites – hence its prominence in the liter-
ature, in particular in the writings of Ivoirian scholars.53 The power of imagi-
nation, however, exceeded the power of reason by far. 
To state that political imagination is powerful in itself is not sufficient 
to understanding the obvious differences in its practice in the north and the 
south. Each side not only developed different images of the nation but also 
engaged in different ways of imagining it. In their efforts to create images of 
the nation as collective imaginaries, they drew on different forms of social 
practice. These social practices are – and this is the core of my argument – 
intrinsically related, because they articulate these images not only for their 
own followers but also in relation to each other; each side implicitly claims 
its normative imagery depicts the only valid image of the nation.   
A comparison reveals more about this articulation of difference. On the 
southern side, the slogan of “second independence” drew its power much 
more from an immensely powerful performative imagination that fascinated 
the younger people. It produced an image for which they had longed for 
years: the promise of “complete equality”. Côte d’Ivoire as a free country 
would, for the first time in its history, recognise what it owed to its youth – 
a powerful youth whose fight on the right side, the side of those who stood 
up against the colonial power, would finally guarantee the youth the place in 
society it deserved. They would be equals and no longer in the endless 
53  Akindès (2004, 2011) provides good overviews. Of course, that privileging of discours 
in the French sense is the legacy of an education system that was deeply penetrated by 
a French understanding of culture.  
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waiting loop they had been caught in for decades, turning men in their for-
ties and even fifties into social cadets. What captivated the young men and 
women were less the speeches of Gbagbo and much more their own seduc-
tive participation in the demonstrations led by Blé Goudé. The image was 
precisely about participation in a larger social body – and the recognition 
and respect this involved. Imagination adopted the appropriate form: ex-
haustive running and enthusiastic dancing and chanting were the suitable 
social practices to produce such an image. The performance was dramatic, 
but it was not drama.54 It was not performed for somebody else or on a 
stage. Very much in the sense of Emile Durkheim’s classical understanding 
of religious performance, it was performed by and for the participants only 
(Durkheim 1912). They were targets and actors at the same time, creating 
the image of the nation by performing it, making it perceptible through eyes, 
ears and the movements of bodies in unison. As imagination, it was a par-
ticipatory practice that produced its images through the direct involvement 
of the actors: “We are powerful! Côte d’Ivoire needs us! Victory for 
Gbagbo! Gbagbo is the nation!”55 
On the northern side, the political imagination also aimed for recogni-
tion and respect, but it did so in another way. It was indebted to another 
background, that of years of discrimination and of the rejected claims to 
equal rights that the people who had learned that they were second-class 
citizens had uttered for so long. This experience was also cast in a text, in 
this case a history of political oppression and cultural alienation that culmi-
nated in the years when they, “the Northerners”, were not allowed to be 
what they were. Again, the text itself was not enough to create a counter-
image of what the Ivoirian nation should be or become. It served as a back-
ground to their way of imagining. Instead of enthusiastic – if not ecstatic – 
participation, it built on carefully orchestrated acts, all of which demon-
strated civic virtues. The hunters held huge meetings and displayed their 
arms in all the major cities under rebel domination, but they always aimed to 
show that they were responsible, even savvy, actors in the political space 
they occupied.56 In Korhogo, the central notion was rigueur, and that implied 
a whole set of civic virtues, because rigour should penetrate the daily prac-
54  On the social significance of performance as inclusive and incorporating social 
practice, see Alexander 2011: 33-43.  
55  Quotations from Youtube videos, see <www.youtube.com/watch?v=FBziQRyN 
44Y&feature=related>, on Gbagbo as the nation <www.youtube.com/watch?v=9 
DovGKn9X5I&feature=related> (11 July 2012), and footnotes 39, 4040. 
56  They successfully disseminated this image through international media, journalists 
and researchers, see, e.g., <www.irinnews.org/report/93384/cote-d-ivoire-dozos-
savvy-political-actors> (14 December 2011).  
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tice of rebel domination: no corruption, no clientelism, no indifference to 
the public interest, no negligence. The image the rebels fostered, after the 
initial turmoil, was one of governance that did not privilege one side or the 
other, or accept discrimination against anyone because of his or her religion, 
political affiliation, social status or whatever else. It was an image of a nation 
to which all Ivoirians should belong without distinction, a nation that would 
overcome the rotten state and the political class that had exploited it.  
Such imagery called for another social practice. Seductive participation 
like that in the southern half of the country would not work in the north. 
The imagery consisted of diverse, apparently unrelated practices, from fair 
taxation to power lines, to monuments, cultural centres and the policing of 
big public events. As imagination, it had to construe these events in one 
image of the nation – it had to make them coherent and convincing as a set, 
or, more precisely, as a figuration in which the different parts gained mean-
ing through their relationship to the other elements.57 The image of a com-
ing, truly Ivoirian nation, one that granted civil rights to all, grew out of the 
actors’ perception that these scattered practices were actually one. Imagina-
tion as a social practice hence had to adopt a different character. The finely 
planned events were often accompanied by plans and timetables distributed 
to the populace. These were sober events and sometimes looked like cook-
books for meaning-making. But even when written schedules did not exist, 
the rebels made sure that a strict plan was respected. They framed the events 
and made them visible as something “well organised” that contributed to 
the image of the rebels as capable actors who were not like the former civil 
servants. These events, plans and timetables also addressed the youth, but 
they did more. Only through “seriousness” and “rigour” would the youth be 
granted their place in society – and that included to some extent their service 
in the rebel movement.58  
Not only the images but also imagination as social practice had adopted 
different forms on each side. However, the sides related to each other. The 
emphasis on reliable, “normal” rigueur on the northern side was also a state-
ment of difference from what had happened in the south. On the occasion 
of the 50th anniversary of independence, many people in Korhogo noted 
with satisfaction that the rebels were able to hold festivities while the gov-
ernment in the south was unable to get anything off the ground. The politi-
cal articulation of claims and interests contributed to the formation of 
57  The coherence of the image is hence a precondition of its possible legitimating 
function and hence different from the latter.  
58  The sources are easy to divine: As the insurgents had often been officers in the 
former national army, they brought their own habits into the military wing of the 
rebel movement. 
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sharper images as well as to the two forms of imagination. In the meantime, 
the two forms of imagination as social practice have become habitual. In 
January 2012, some actors in the north argued that they did not want the 
state administration to return because it would jeopardise the more efficient 
forms of governance that had emerged in the intervening years. That would 
not be, a quarter headman told me, “truly Ivoirian”.  
However, as the articulation of difference between the two camps con-
tinues, partisans of both aim to maintain their own ways of imagining. The 
two forms of imagination still build on the former social practices and still 
produce similar images. They will surely surface again. And whatever kind of 
discourse the present government engages in will have to face the insurgent 
nationalism.  
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Rebellischer Nationalismus: Politische Vorstellungen und  
Spaltung in Côte d’Ivoire 
Zusammenfassung: Nichtseparatistische Aufständische, die nicht in der 
Lage sind, eine Regierung zu stürzen, stehen oft vor einem Problem, das 
sich nach erfolgreichen Rebellionen gar nicht stellt: Sie sind nicht die einzige 
politische Kraft, die behaupten kann, im Interesse der Nation zu handeln. 
Ihnen stellt sich daher die Aufgabe, eine neue Idee der Nation zu entwi-
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ckeln, mit der sie sich vom bisherigen, älteren Nationalismus, wie er von der 
Regierung vertreten wird, unterscheiden. Dieser neue Nationalismus zielt 
darauf ab, die Aktionen der Rebellen zu rechtfertigen; zunächst und vor 
allem muss er aber attraktiv sein für die Bevölkerung der Region, die von 
ihnen kontrolliert wird, und später für weitere Teile der Bevölkerung. Regie-
rung und Aufständische konfrontieren das jeweils andere Lager mit dem 
eigenen Verständnis der Nation. In diesem Prozess benutzen beide Seiten 
verschiedene Vorstellungen und Bilder, um das Spezifische ihres Nationa-
lismus für ihre Anhänger, aber auch für Parteigänger im anderen Lager kla-
rer herauszuarbeiten. Die Ereignisse in Côte d’Ivoire dienen dem Autor als 
Beispiel, um diese Form politischer Auseinandersetzung zu analysieren. 
Schlagwörter: Côte d’Ivoire, Aufstand/Revolte, Politische Kultur, Natio-
nalismus 
